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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Appellees do not dispute this Court's jurisdiction. The Order transferring
review of this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals is attached at Addendum A.
R.963-65.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

ISSUEl

Whether the trial court correctly granted Defendant's counter-motion for
summary judgment, because the facts are undisputed any applicable statutes of
limitations ran prior to the filing of this case in 2008, in favor of the
Defendants/ Appellees Boyd J. Brown, Sentry Financial Corporation, and SFC
Aircraft Corp t (hereafter collectively "Brown")?
ISSUE 2

Whether the trial court correctly determined and applied the statute of
limitations?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
11

law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal
conclusion and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for
correctness .... " Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2,

,r 6, 177 P.3d 600. In reviewing the

grant or denial of summary judgment, appellate courts view "[t]he facts and all
reasonable inferences ... in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
Higgins v. Salt Lake Cnty., 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). However, appellate
1

courts affirm where, even according to the facts as contended by the losing
Ii

party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Themy v.
Seagull Enters., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979).

The application of a statute of limitations is a question of law. See Arnold v.
Grigsby,2009 UT 88, 17,225 P.3d 781.
PRESERVATION

Brown argued these issues before the trial court during the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment. R. 264-65; 271-397; 913-15. See Order from
Hearings on Motions for Summary Judgment at R.913-15, attached at Addendum
B. The trial court gave further detail of the opinion granting summary judgment
in its Ruling which denied Plaintiffs' Rules 59(b) and 60(b) Motions. R. 946-56.
Denial of the Rules 59(b) and 60(b) Motions has not been appealed but because
the Ruling addresses the facts and law of the summary judgment decision in
part, this information is applicable to this Appeal, while the arguments and facts
raised by the Plaintiffs for the first time are not. See Ruling at R.946-56; attached
as AddendumC.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

Utah Code § 78B-2-104, attached at Addendum D
Utah Code § 78B-2-305, attached at Addendum E
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, attached at Addendum F
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This is essentially a statute of limitations case arising from a breached loan
agreement. The loan contract ("Letter Agreement") was entered into by
Appellant Majestic Airline Inc. ("Majestic") and by Appellee SFC AircraftCorp I,
an entity initially formed and held by Appellee Sentry Financial Corporation
(collectively "Sentry"). See Letter Agreement at R.299-302, attached at
Addendum G. Sentry's $483,102.43 loan to Majestic was personally guaranteed
by two separate guaranty contracts, (1) between Appellant David Gillett
("Gillett"), the sole shareholder of Majestic, and Sentry; and (2) between Boyd
Brown, who was an acquaintance of Gillett, and Sentry. R.299-302. See Brown
Guaranty and Waiver at 304-06, attached at Addendum H.
After Majestic failed to make its first and multiple subsequent payments,
Sentry demanded a partial guaranty payment by guarantor Brown in the amount
of nearly $250,000, which was less than half of Majestic's then outstanding
balance owed to Sentry. R.214-215; 308; 389; 395. Brown made the partial
guaranty payment as required by his guaranty contract, and neither Brown nor
Sentry notified Gillett/Majestic of Brown's partial guaranty payment, as Sentry's
demand for Brown's partial guaranty payment was pursuant to a separate
agreement between Sentry and Brown, to which Gillett was not a party. R.3903

392; 304-306. Sentry subsequently initiated foreclosure proceedings against
Majestic for Majestic' s outstanding obligation, and ultimately held an auction in
October 1995 at which the Majestic collateral was sold along with personal
property put up by guarantor Gillett, in order to recoup Majestic' s outstanding
obligation to Sentry. R.352-353. Majestic' s outstanding obligation was not
reduced by Brown's partial guaranty payment, and Sentry promptly reimbursed
Brown his partial guaranty payment from the auction proceeds. R.359; 394.
The Letter Agreement was signed more than twenty years ago, in April
1994, and by 1995, Gillett/Majestic' s failure to perform their contracted
obligations amounted to a breach of contract. R.299-302; 308; 913-915. In 2002,
Gillett learned of Brown's partial guaranty payment of nearly $250,000 made
pursuant to Brown's personal guaranty. R.182; 304-306. Approximately five years
later, in 2007, Gillett/Majestic filed a Complaint against Brown, SFC
AircraftCorp I and Sentry, alleging breach of contract by Brown and Sentry, and
fraud by Boyd Brown. R.1-17; 913-915; 946-956. After the 2007 case was dismissed
without prejudice, Gillett/Majestic filed the case at bar in 2008. R.1-17.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Gillett/Majestic' s Statement of Facts sets forth several pages of information
that contain numerous legal conclusions and factual allegations not supported by
the Record. The district court's Order from Hearing on Motions for Summary
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Judgment (Addendum B at R.913-915) and its Ruling on Plaintiff's Rule 59 &
Rule 60(b) Motions (Addendum Cat R.946-956) recite the material, undisputed
facts upon which the court's legal conclusions are based; however, Gillett' s
Statement of Facts include alleged facts that contradict the facts stated by the
district court. Thus, a significant portion of the "facts" in the opening brief
essentially amount to unsupported allegations pulled from Gillett' s own
affidavits. Brown will not respond in kind, but instead will limit his statement of
facts to those that are undisputed, supported by the Record, and relevant to the
issues before the Court.
Sentry's Loan to Majestic
In 1994, Majestic Airlines Inc., a small airline company owned by David
Gillett, was in default on a loan contract it had with Textron Financial
Corporation in the amount of $454,021.99. R.299; 343. On April 29, 1994, Majestic
~

entered into a contract with Sentry for a loan to Majestic in the amount of
$483,102.43, which would be repaid to Sentry by Majestic. R.299. The purpose of
the loan was to prevent the impending foreclosure of Majestic' s collateral assets
by Textron Financial Corporation as a result of Majestic' s default on its loan with
Textron. R.350; 370.
Due to Gillett/Majestic's default on the Textron loan, Sentry would not
originate a loan to Gillett/Majestic with Majestic' s assets as the only security for
the loan. R.393. Accordingly, in addition to Majestic' s assets as security for the
loan, Gillett personally guaranteed the loan to Majestic; Sentry additionally
5

required a personal guaranty of the loan by Boyd Brown. R.304-306; 344-345; 350.
Brown was selected as a guarantor because of his personal relationships
with both David Gillett and Jonathan Ruga, CEO of Sentry. R.344. Sentry and
Majestic were signatory parties to a .,,Letter Agreement," the contract which
outlines the terms of the loan from Sentry to Gillett/Majestic. R.299-302. David
Gillett and Boyd Brown were both listed as personal guarantors of the loan in the
"Letter Agreement." R.299-302. Consistent with his guaranty of the loan, on May
23, 1994, Brown entered into a separate contract with Sentry for his guaranty of
the $483,102.43 loan Sentry made to Majestic; Brown received $20,000 as
consideration for his guaranty contract with Sentry. R.304-306.
After entering the "Letter Agreement" with Sentry, Majestic failed to make
its first several payments, including an approximately $30,000 interim payment it
was required to make. R.308. In fact, from the time Gillett/Majestic entered the
Letter Agreement to the time of Sentry's foreclosure of Majestic' s secured
collateral, Majestic only made a total of three (3) payments in the amount of
$15,779.57 each. R.308. A credit of approximately $8,000 against the loan balance
was not actually paid by Majestic, but was applied to Majestic' s loan payments
because Sentry had received a credit from Textron. R.308; 351-352.
Sentry repeatedly attempted to contact Gillett regarding his/Majestic's
multiple missed loan payments. R.350. Finally, as a result of Gillett/Majestic' s
failure to perform the terms of the Letter Agreement with Sentry, Sentry initiated
default proceedings. R.386. Pursuant to Brown's contract with Sentry for Brown's
6

personal guaranty of the loan, Sentry could have required Brown to pay the full
amount owed by Majestic, which at that time equaled over $500,000. R.304-306;
308. However, on March 17, 1995, instead of demanding the full overdue balance
owed by Majestic, Sentry required Brown to make a partial personal guaranty
payment of $249,964.88. R.214-215; 395. Brown paid the requested $249,964.88 to
Sentry on March 17, 1995:·R.390-391. Neither Brown nor Sentry disclosed
Brown's partial guaranty payment to Gillett, as Gillett was not a partyto Brown's
. guaranty contract with Sentry. R.304-06; 392.
On April 26, 1995, Sentry was awarded a default judgment against
Majestic for its claim for the outstanding obligation owed to Sentry by Majestic
pursuant to the Letter Agreement. R.359. The judgment amount entered against
Majestic was not reduced by Brown's partial guaranty payment. R.359.
In order to recover the default judgment awarded to Sentry against
Majestic and recoup the unpaid loan, Sentry arranged for a public auction of the
Majestic collateral to be held on October 5, 1995. R.352-353. Consistent with
Gillett' s personal guaranty of Sentry's loan to Majestic, some of Gillett' s personal
assets were additionally sold at the auction. R.179; 213.
After the auction, there was disagreement between Gillett and Sentry
regarding the accounting from the auction of Majestic' s collateral. R.355-358. On
December 4, 1996, Gillett signed a Mutual Release with Sentry. R.948. See Mutual
Release at R.317, attached at Addendum I. The plain language of the Release
precludes suit between the parties over matters arising from Sentry's loan to
7

Majestic, Sentry s subsequent foreclosure on Majestic' s collateral, and the auction
held by Majestic; the Release also specifically states that the parties will release
and hold harmless Boyd Brown for claims arising from the subject loan. R.317.
At a deposition of Jonathan Ruga (CEO of Sentry) in March 2002 for
another matter, Gillett learned that Brown had made a partial guaranty payment
to Sentry in 1995. R.182 ..
Status of Majestic Airlines Inc.

Majestic Airlines, Inc. was registered as a Utah business on March 21, 1984.
R.330-331. Majestic's business registration expired June 1, 1993. R.330-331.
Majestic was again registered on January 18, 1995, and its registration again
expired April 1, 1996. R.330-331. Majestic Airlines, Inc. is not currently registered
as a business. R330-331. Majestic Airlines, Inc. has been dissolved as a company
since 1996, and Gillett's shares in Majestic were disposed of through his 1998
personal bankruptcy proceedings. R.336; 375.
Procedural History

Gillett originally filed his Complaint, case no. 070409723, in June of 20071 .
R.425; 901. Case no. 070409723 was dismissed without prejudice, and Gillett re-

In their opening brief, Gillett alleged for the first time that he originally filed a
Complaint for the claims alleged in the case at bar in 2003, case number
030919800 (Appellant's Brief, pg. 17 of hard copy, pg. 19 of digital copy). As
evidenced by Gillett' s failure to cite to the Record for such Complaint and case,
such allegation was never made to the trial court; indeed, Gillett alleged to the
trial court that this matter was filed in 2007 as case no. 070409723, and the trial
court confirmed that this matter was first filed in 2007. R.901; 946; 949-50.
1
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filed his Complaint under the" savings statute" on September 29, 2008. R.901;
946; 949-950. Gillett's Complaint alleges 1) Breach of Contract against Brown; 2)
Breach of Contract against Sentry and SFC; 3) Fraud against Brown; 4) Judicial
Accounting; and 5) Declaratory Judgment. R.947.
At the time Gillett filed his Complaint, Boyd Brown was re~iding in
Wyoming, but at all relevant 'times he was a resident of Salt Lake City and had an
agent within the State of Utah. R.946. Sentry and its previous subsidiary, SFC
Aircraft Corp I, are Utah corporations. R.947.
On August 24, 2012, Gillett submitted a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. R.171-215. On October 10, 2012, Brown submitted a Memorandum in
Opposition to Gillett' s motion and in support of Brown's Counter-Motion for
Summary Judgment. R.271-397.
After extensive briefing and a hearing on the parties' motions on
December 16, 2013, the trial court granted Brown's Counter-Motion for Summary
Judgment, dismissing Gillett's Complaint with prejudice. R.913-15. The trial
court found that Majestic had wound up its business and ceased to exist; the
statute of limitations for Gillett' s claims of breach of contract had run in 2001, six
years after Gillett/Majestic' s initial breach of the Letter Agreement; and that the
statute of limitations for Gillett's claims of fraud had run in 2005, three years
after Gillett discovered Brown's partial guaranty payment.
9

Gillett thereafter submitted a Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and Rule 60(b)
Motion to Set Aside Judgment. R.606-08. Instead of submitting a Memorandum
in Support his motion, Gillett submitted a document otherwise identical to the
motion document, except it was electronically submitted as "Memorandum of
. Law in Support Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and Rule 60(b) Motion
..

to Set Aside Judgment." R.609-11; 950. Counsel for Brown notified counsel for
Gillett of an error in his submission, but Gillett did not resubmit a Memorandum
of Law. R.893; 921; 950.
Without an opportunity to .review Gillett' s Memorandu~ of Law, Brown
submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to the post-trial motions based upon
the limited content of Gillett' s "Motion" document (R.881-901) and Affidavit of
Gillett (R.612-14), and after Gillett failed to timely submitted a reply
memorandum, Brown filed a Request to Submit Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion for
New Trial and Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment for Decision, on April
14, 2014. R.920-23. Gillett subsequently submitted his Reply supporting the Rule
50 and Rule 60(b) motions. R.926-33.
Although Gillett' s Rule 59 and Rule 60(b) motions were not accompanied
by a memorandum of law, the district court prepared and entered a Ruling on
Gillett' s post-trial motions, in which the district court provided the factual and
legal basis for its decision to deny such motions. R.946-56.
10

Gillett subsequently filed the appeal at bar. R.957-58.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In the summary judgment proceedings below, Gillett failed to present
issues of material fact to preclude summary judgment. The trial court correctly
held that the statute of limitations for Gillett' s cause of action of fraud expired in
2005. This case was filed.in 2008. Even considering the savings statute, Utah
Code Ann.§ 78B-2-111, Gillett failed to file his cause of action of fraud within the
. statute of lrmitations when he filed his initial case in 2007, and as such the trial
court correctly dismissed the fraud claims with prejudice.
The trial court correctly held that the statute of limitations for Gillett's
cause of action for breach of contract commenced in 1995 and ran in 2001. The
trial court determined that the concealment at issue was an alleged concealment
of fraud which therefore tolled the statute of limitations until 2002; the statute of
limitations for any concealed fraud expired in 2005. The trial court also found
that the parties signed a release of all claims in 1996 which released all claims
thereby except for Gillett' s alleged claim of fraud, discovered in 2002 and expired
in 2005.
Gillett's appeal is meritless as it does not provide a basis in the law to
overturn the trial court's decision and further attempts to continue to drag out
this lawsuit, which the trial court termed to be "merely a veiled attempt to take a
ll

second bite at the apple." R.955. Gillett' s Brief attempts to raise arguments and
present material that were not raised properly before the trial court. Gillett' s
Brief is deficient according to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in that the
Brief does not support the arguments presented therein with analysis or
application of applicable law _anc!. is predominantly conjecture and opinion, not
· legal argument based on the ~aw and so fails tn provide adequate legal analysis
and legal authority in support of his claims. Thus Gillett has inappropriately
compelled Brown to develop Gillett' s argument through his own research and
interpretation of Gillett's ·Brie~ as well as respond accordingly.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED BROWN'S COUNTER
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Gillett has limited the appeal to the trial court's ruling on the countermotions for summary judgment. See Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal, R.957-58. Gillett
has not pursued an appeal on any of the trial court's subsequent rulings.
Accordingly, in determining whether the trial court properly granted summary
judgment, this Court should limit its consideration to the arguments before the
trial court at the time it granted Brown's counter-motion for summary judgment.
As noted above, to the extent that the trial court's Ruling addresses the summary
judgment, it too is properly considered.

12

A. Gillett Has Presented No Disputed Material Facts That Preclude
Summary Judgment
Gillett' s Brief provides three material facts as being in dispute and which
thus prevent summary judgment; "1. Boyd Brown's continuous (since mid-1990s)
residence out-of-state, as asserted by Plaintiffs ... and as acknowledged by
Defendants." Appellant's Brief ,r22: "2. The claims of Majestic Airlines were
pursuant to the 'winding up' of its corporate affairs." Appellant's Brief 'U22. "3.
Majestic Airlines' default in making the monthly repayments does not
necessarily constitute a 'breach' ... " Appellant's Brief ,r22. To the extent that these
three statements are facts, as opposed to questions of law, none are dispositive of
the grant of summary judgment as will be fully illustrated below.
First, Gillett noted that both Defendants and Plaintiffs recognized Boyd
Brown's residence out of state. R.946. This fact is clearly not in dispute and was
not in dispute when the trial court determined correctly that "[j]urisdiction, both
subject matter and personal, are appropriate before this court." Ruling ,r2 citing
Complaint at if 7, Addendum C at R.947. Thus Gillett' s first disputed fact is not a
disputed material fact that prevents summary judgment pursuant to Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.
Second, Majestic Airlines was found to "no longer be a viable corporation,
Majestic' s winding-up period has expired." Order from Hearing on Motions for
Summary Judgment if 2, Addendum Bat R.914. Majestic was "dissolved as a
13

corporation in or about April 1996. Therefore, the true party in interest is David
K Gillett." Ruling ,r3, Addendum C at R.948. This fact was cited in Gillett' s Brief
as preventing summary judgment though there is no reference to why and/ or
how this fact matters in regards to preventing summary judgment. Even if this
fact were in dispute it would not prevent summary judgment. The trial court
found that Majestic Airlines' winding-up period had expired'in both its Order
from Hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment and in the later Ruling, as
noted above.
"A trial court s findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly
1

erroneous." Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2009 UT 81,
1164 citing Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,

,r 17, 222 P.3d

,r 19, 100 P.3d 1177. "A party challenging

a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding." Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(9) (2015). Thus, for Gillett to challenge this
finding of fact, he would need to have marshaled the evidence. "To establish that
a factual finding is clearly erroneous, the appealing party must marshal all the
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most
favorable to the court below." Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2009 UT 81,

,r 17,222 P.3d 1164 citing State v.

Clark, 2005 UT 75,

,r 17, 124 P.3d 235 (internal

quotation marks omitted). "If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this court
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assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." Traco Steel

Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2009 UT 81, ,r 17,222 P.3d 1164 (internal citations
omitted). Gillett's second disputed fact has not been properly challenged and as
such does not prevent summary judgment.
Third, Gillett contends that Majestic Airlines' default in making the
·monthly repayments does not necessarily constitute a breach. The trial court
found that the "Plaintiffs were the first party to breach the contract at issue in
1995." R.947. The trial court cited to Plaintiff Gillett' s Complaint to show that "In
1994 Majestic Airlines entered into a contract with Defendants ... " and, "In or
about March 1995, Majestic was in default on the terms of the agreement it had
with Sentry." Ruling at ,2 citing Complaint at,, 13 and 19, Addendum Cat
R.947. The trial court determined that under the first breach doctrine, Plaintiff's
default represented the first breach. "[U]nder the first breach rule a party first
guilty of a substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if the other
party thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on performance by the
other party nor maintain an action ... for a subsequent failure to perform." Cross

v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, , 25, 303 P.3d 1030 citing CCD, LC v. Millsap, 2005 UT
42,, 29, 116 P.3d 366 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, "[w]hether a breach of a contract constitutes a material breach is a
question of fact ...." Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135,, 29,303 P.3d 1030 citing
15

Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 2005 UT App 430,

,r 26, 124 P.3d 269. Thus the trial

court's factual determination of the breach can only be challenged by Appellant's
marshaling of the evidence, in accord with the discussion of the second disputed
fact above. Namely, "If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this court
assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." Traco Steel
Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc.~ 2009 UT 81,

,r 17,222 P.3d 1164 (internal citations

omitted). Thus, Gillett's third disputed fact has not been properly challenged and
as such does not prevent summary judgment.
B. Appellees Are Entitled To Summary Judgment As A Matter Of Law

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). As noted, Gillett has not presented this Court with
any genuine issue of material fact that prevents summary judgment. Thus,
summary judgment is proper as a matter of law pursuant to the trial court's
determination that "[t]he parties signed a release of all claims in 1996. All claims
are thereby released except for Plaintiff's claim of fraud, which was discovered in
2002. The statute of limitations for fraud expired in 2005." R.914. This Court has
held that, summary judgment is appropriate where failure to provide reasons, as
required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), to support the contention that disputes of
material of fact existed. Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT App 30, 18 P.3d 1137. Further,
16

the Supreme Court of Utah has held that, an appellate court "may affirm a grant
of summary judgment upon any grounds apparent in the record." Park v.
Stanford, 2011 UT 41,

,r 27,258 P.3d 566.

II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED AND APPLIED THE
APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Appellant's Issues II, III, And IV Were Raised Fo.r The First Time In The
Appellant's Brief And As Such Were Not Preserved And Are Not
Properly Presented To This Court
"It is a well-established rule that a defendant who fails to bring an issue

before the trial court is generally barred from raising it the first time on appeal."
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The arguments II, III, and IV,

raised by Gillett in this appeal were not properly raised before the trial court and
as such were not preserved for appeal. See Appellant's Brief, "Preservation," at

,r,r7-10. However, even if these issues had been duly preserved, they would not
have changed the trial court s correct decision to grant summary judgment in
1

Brown's favor.
Gillett states that his Issues II and III were "preserved for appeal within
11

the plaintiffs' motion for new trial", together with the supplemental materials
related thereto." Appellant's Brief,

,r,rs-9 (internal quotations in original). As

noted above, this appeal is from the trial court's ruling on the counter-motions
11

for summary judgment. See Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal, R.957-58. An appeal of
a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant
17

of relief. The appeal does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the
underlying judgment from. which relief was sought." Franklin Covey Client Sales v.

Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ,r 1, 2 P.3d 451.
Similarly, a denial of a Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 59 motion for new trial is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and the appellate court will
reverse the trial court"' only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision." Smith

v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 1 25, 82 P.3d 1064. Thus, issues presented for
the first time on appeal through Plaintiff's motions for new trial and to set aside
judgment should not be considered by this Court pursuant to precedent that,
u(a]n inquiry into the merits of the underlying judgment or order must be the
subject of a direct appeal from. that judgment or order." Franklin Covey Client

Sales v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, 11, 2 P.3d 451. Because these were not raised
below, and because Gillett has provided no additional basis for this Court to
review an issue not preserved in the trial court, Gillett has waived the right to
present this issue on appeal.
B. The Trial Court Correctly Applied The 3-Year Statute of Limitation For
Fraud

As noted above, this issue, Appellant's Issue II, was not properly
preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs' motions for new trial and to set aside
judgment. In further support of the argument that this issue was not properly
presented to the trial court and so should not be considered in this appeal, the
18

trial court noted that,
On March 15, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Rule 59(b) and 60(b) Motion.
Although the docket reflects that Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in
support, the memorandum is the exact same as the original Motion.
That is, both documents are approximately three (3) pages long and
do not provide any legal support, analysis or discussion. The Court
finds that Plaintiffs' arguments, as reflected in the Motion, are
untenable.
Ruling," Analysis and Discussion," Addendum Cat R.950.
This Court has previously established how to determine if an issue is
proper to be considered on appeal in that, "[t]he trial court must address an
argument before it may be considered on appeal." Holman v. Callister, Duncan &

Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895, 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Court further emphasized
that, "The argument must be reasonably discernible from the pleadings,
affidavits and exhibits." Id. Additionally, "even when an appellate court liberally
construes the record in favor of a party, as it must on review of a summary
judgment, there must be a factual showing or submission of legal authority
before the argument will be deemed to have been raised at the trial court level."

Id. Thus, pursuant to the standard provided in Holman, Gillett did not properly
present the arguments to the trial court and as such they are not properly
considered for appeal.
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C. Even If Non-Preserved Arguments Are Addressed, They Further Show
That The Trial Court Correctly Determined And Applied The Proper
Statute Of Limitations In Granting Summary Judgment For Brown
1. The Trial Court Correctly Applied the 3-year Statute of Limitations
for Fraud

Gillett alleged breach of contract claims against Brown, Sentry, and SFC; as
well as a claim of fraud against Brown. R.9-12; 947. In 1994, Gillett/Majestic
entered into a contract with Sentry where Brown was a guarantor of the loan
from Sentry to Gillett/Majestic. R.393; 947. Gillett/Majestic had defaulted on the
terms of the agreement with Sentry by or about March 1995. R.947. Gillett alleged
in his Complaint that after Majestic defaulted on the loan Brown made a
guarantor's payment to Sentry in or about July 1995. R.947. Gillett alleges he was
unaware of this payment until March 2002. R.9; 947. The parties entered into a
Mutual Release in which Gillett/Majestic released all their claims against
Brown/Sentry. R.8; 947. Gillett alleges that they did not learn about the "fraud"
of Brown - not disclosing his guarantor's payment made to Sentry - until March
of 2002, which Gillett claims fraudulently induced his signing the Release. R.948.
However, as illustrated by the trial court, this alleged fraud occurred well
after Gillett/Majestic' s breach of contract. R.948. The trial court determined that
"[a]lthough concealment is at issue, the concealment pertains to Defendants'
I

alleged fraud inducing Plaintiffs to sign the release in December 1996, which
Plaintiffs alleged to not have discovered until March 2002." R.949. The trial court
20

determined that "because the alleged fraud was discovered by Plaintiffs in
March 2002, Plaintiffs' third cause of action, Fraud against Mr. Brown ran in
March 2005." R.950. The trial court detailed the basis for this finding and further
stated, "Moreover, Plaintiffs' June 2007 case 070409723, filed in West Jordan, did
not save or otherwise preserve Plaintiffs' fraud claim because it was still filed
two (2) years after the three (3) year statute of limitation had run." R.950.

On appeal, Gillett references only one case in the first ten pages of his
argument, Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741.
Appellant's Brief, if if 23-24. Gillett does not provide any analysis of Russell

Packard to the instant case. However, at one point Gillett states that
"commencement of that statute was 'tolled' pursuant to the 'equitable discovery'
doctrine articulated in Russell Packard ... " Appellant's Brief if23 (internal
quotations and bold in original). Gillett later states "the District Court seemingly
correctly applied the 'fraudulent concealment' doctrine (from Packard
Development, supra)." Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d

741 (internal quotations and bold in original). Gillett concluded that the district
court erred in its subsequent selection and application of the 3-year statute of
limitations to bar the claims. Id.
In Russell Packard, the Court took the "opportunity to first clarify the
appropriate circumstances under and the means by which the discovery rule
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may operate to toll a statute of limitations." Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005
UT 14, ,r 19, 108 P.3d 741. The Court specifically provided that "[a]n example of a
statutory discovery rule is found in the three-year statute of limitations
governing claims based on fraud or mistake, which provides that a cause of
action will not accrue "until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake." Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ,r
21, 108 P.3d 741 citing Utah Code Ann.§ 78-12-26(3) (2002) current Utah Code
Ann.§ 78B-2-305 (2015). The Court in Russell Packard stated that the

determination of when a plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have
discovered their cause of action can be difficult/ fact intensive. Id. However,
" [o ]nee the triggering event identified by the statutory discovery rule occurs--i.e.,
when a plaintiff first has actual or constructive knowledge ... of the cause of
action--the statutory limitations period begins to run and a plaintiff who desires
to file a claim must do so within the time specified in the statute. Otherwise, the
claim will be barred." Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,

,r 22. Further,

the Court held, "Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action will neither
prevent the running of the statute of limitations nor excuse a plaintifPs failure to
file a claim within the relevant statutory period." Id. at 20.
This case is nearly identical to the specific example/ explanation provided
in Russell Packard, where applying a statutory discovery rule contained in the 322

year statute of limitations for fraud, the statute would begin running from the
date a plaintiff either discovered or should have discovered their claim. Id. at 23.
"A plaintiff would then have three years from that date within which to file a
complaint before the statute would bar recovery on the claim." Id. Gillett alleges
that Brown's fraudulent concealment was discovered in 2002. R.8-12. Thus, the
trial c~urt correctly determined that the statutory 3-year statute of li:rcitations for
fraud would apply, thereby establishing that the statute of limitations ran in 2005
and Gillett's suit filed in 2007 did not save or preserve the fraud claim. R.949.
This conclusion would be reached even if the concealment version of the
discovery doctrine applied. However, the Court in Russell Packard stated that, .,.,it
would be inappropriate to apply the concealment version of the discovery rule in
the context of the three-year statute of limitations for fraud." Id. at 25. The Court
stated that, .,.,the concealment version of the discovery rule does not
automatically operate to toll the limitations period until the plaintiff's actual or
~

constructive discovery of his or her claim." Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005
UT 14,126. Thus under either version of the discovery rule, Gillett's knowledge
of a possible fraudulent concealment issue commenced the statute of limitations,
for 3-years, from 2002 to 2005. As such the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment based on relevant statute of limitations and should be affirmed by this
Court.
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2. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted And Analyzed Utah Code
§ 78B-2-104, Absence From The State, On The Statute Of Limitations
In This Case

Even though Gillett failed to support his argument for tolling the statute of
limitations based on absence from the state, the trial court addressed the
contentions and found, u Although Plaintiffs specifically cite Section 78B-2-104 in
its Motion, following Defendants'_Opposition, Plaintiffs, in their Reply, assert
that the pre-2008 amended version, Section 78-12-35 is applicable. The Court
finds that under either version Plaintiffs' claim that Mr. Brown's out-of-state
resident status tolls the statute of limitations fails." R.951.
The trial court found that "'in signing the April 29, 1994, Letter Agreement
and Guarantee and Waiver, Mr. Brown consented to resolve all matters in the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah." R.951-52. Also, "'neither party disputes the validity of the forum
selection clauses." R. 952. The trial court determined that Gillett misconstrued the
statutory language of Utah Code § 78-12-35, and therefore, the purpose of the
provision. See Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (Utah 1964) (The Utah Supreme
Court explained "'that the objective of [78-12-35] was to prevent a defendant from
depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from
the state during the period of limitation.") R.953.
Gillett did not argue that he was unable to locate Brown; rather he argued
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that he was inconvenienced in having to serve and depose Brown, who was
living in Wyoming. R.954. The trial court concluded stating, "The fact that Mr.
Brown was served in Wyoming and the alleged inconvenience of Plaintiffs in
attempting to timely depose Mr. Brown does not invoke Section 78-12-35 and
therefore does not toll the statute of limitations of Plaintiffs' breach of contract
.

.

and fraud claims." R.954. See Tracey v. Blood, 3 P.2d 263,266 (Utah 1931)
(" Apparently all courts are agreed ... that the burden was upon the plaintiff to
plead and prove facts sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.") R.954-55.
Therefore, the trial court correctly denied Gillett's argument in this regard. R.955.
3. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That Majestic Airlines Period For
Winding-Up Had Expired

Gillett argues that Utah Code§ 16-l0a-1405 does not provide a stated
period of limitations for the winding-up of a corporate entity. Appellant's Brief,

,IlO. In Gillett' s argument regarding the trial court's winding-up ruling, Gillett
fails to cite to any relevant case law for support and/ or analysis for his opinions
regarding corporate winding up. Appellant's Brief, 1153-55. Gillett fails to
provide an argument in regards to a possible change in the result that could be
affected by establishing that the winding-up period had not expired. However,
even if Gillett had provided an argument in this regard it would fail. The trial
court found that Majestic Airlines was dissolved as a corporation in April 1996.
R.948. This is a non-disputed question of fact because it is based on public record,
25

specifically the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code business
records for Majestic Airlines show the corporation was expired in April 1996.
R.330-31.
Gillett's interpretation of Utah Code§ 16-l0a-1405 ignores the provision
regarding disposition of claims against a dissolved corporation in § 16-l0a-1407
·. which states, "A dissolved corporation may publish notice of its dissolution and
request persons with claims against the corporation present them in accordance
with the notice." Id. (1) (2015). Further, the statute explicitly states that any claim
unless sooner barred under§ 16-l0a-1406 or other applicable statute of
limitations is barred unless the claimant commences an action against the
dissolved corporation within five years after publication of the notice, or after
seven years if no notification was published. Utah Code Ann.§ 16-l0a-1407(3)-(5)
(2015). Thus, if claims are barred against a dissolved corporation after 5-7 years,
then claims should intuitively be barred on behalf of a dissolved corporation to
the same respect.
When interpreting statutes, Utah case law dictates that all parts of an act
are considered, as a whole, for a complete understanding/ interpretation of the
section; pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's instruction to "read the plain
language of [a] statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with
other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." State v. Harker, 2010 UT
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56, ,I 12, 240 P.3d 780. The trial court's determination that Majestic' s time period
for winding-up had expired was in accord with the relevant statute. Further, this
issue was not properly presented for appeal nor has it been properly supported
by citation to law and the record, nor does this argument change the outcome of
the summary judgment decision. As such this argument does not provide this
Court a basis for overturning the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
4. The Trial Court Correctly Analyzed And Applied The First Breach
Doctrine To This Case
"[U]nder the first breach rule a party first guilty of a substantial or material
breach of contract cannot complain if the other party thereafter refuses to
perform. He can neither insist on performance by the other party nor maintain an
action against the other party for a subsequent failure to perform." Cross v. Olsen,
2013 UT App 135, ,I 25, 303 P.3d 1030 citing CCD, LC v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, ,I 29,
116 P.3d 366 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Utah Supreme
Court has held that "Only a material breach will excuse further performance by
the non-breaching party." McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2012 UT 22,

,I 28 n.7, 274 P.3d 981. Utah case precedent further provides, "Whether a breach
of a contract constitutes a material breach is a question of fact ...." Cross v.
Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, ,I 29 citing Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 2005 UT App

430, ,I 26, 124 P.3d 269.
The Court in Cross stated, "Summary judgment is appropriate on such
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factual questions when they fall on either end of a factual continuum: when there
could be no reasonable difference of opinion, or when the facts are so tenuous,
vague, or insufficiently established that determining [the factual issue] becomes
completely speculative." Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135,

,r 29 citing Harline v.

Barker, 912 P.2d 433,439 (Utah 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
The case at hand presents a factual question appropriate for summary
judgment pursuant to the standard expressed in Cross, above. Namely, both
parties acknowledged that the loan between Gillett/Majestic and Sentry was
meant to be paid back in monthly installments and further acknowledge that
Majestic defaulted on those payments. Clearly where a contract is based on
borrowing money to be paid back on a monthly basis, defaulting on payments is
a material breach of the contract. Because Gillett/Majestic defaulted on the
contract, the trial court correctly ruled that, "Plaintiffs' were the first party to
breach the contract at issue in 1995 and therefore, the six (6) year statute of
limitations expired in 2001." R.948-49.
III.

APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS DEFICIENT AND/OR MERITLESS AND/OR
FRIVOLOUS
A. Appellant's Brief Failed To Meet Utah R. App. P. 24(k)'s Requirements
And Placed A Tremendous Burden Of Factual And Legal Research on
Opposing Counsel

Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a brief to be
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11

concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and

free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. 11 Utah R.
App. P. 24(k) (2015). If the brief does not meet these requirements, rule 24(k)
states that 11 the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 11 Id.
"This court has previously awarded attorney fees where the failure to file an
opening brief that complied with rule 24(k) placed a tremendous burden of
factual and legal research on opposing counsel." Simmons Media Grp., LLC v.
Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145,

UT App 389,

,r 48,335 P.3d 885 citing In re Estate of Pahl, 2007

,r 17, 174 P.3d 642 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Utah Court of Appeals addressed the requirements under Rule 24(k)
and stated, "Failure to adhere to these requirements increase[s] the costs of
litigation for both parties and unduly burden[s] the judiciary's time and energy.
Failure to adhere to the requirements may invite the court to impose serious
consequences, such as disregarding or striking the briefs, or assessing attorney
fees against the offending lawyer." Ninow v. Lowe (In re Estate of Pahl), 2007 UT
App 389, ,r 17, 174 P.3d 642 citing State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, Pll, 99 P.3d 820
(alterations in original) (citation omitted).
In Ninow, the Court of Appeals awarded reasonable attorney fees after the
Petitioner pointed to several aspects of the Respondents' brief that failed to meet
the briefing requirements and complained of the 11 convoluted 11 nature of
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Respondents' opening brief with many issues completely lacking in cogent
O

analysis or supporting authority. See Ninow, at 18. The Court held that a
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may
dump the burden of argument and research." Id. at 17.
Gillett's appeal is frivolous pursuant to Utah R. App. P. Rule 33, which·
states that "a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. App. P. Rule 33
(2015). As noted by the trial court, i/Plaintiffs' objections are merely a veiled
attempt to take a second bite at the apple and are therefore overruled." R.955.
This lawsuit has taken years to finally be correctly dismissed pursuant to
summary judgment, at great cost to both parties as well as the judicial system.
The only new facts/ arguments presented by Gillett on appeal are improper for
not being preserved but regardless were still thoroughly addressed and denied
by the trial court as being misinterpretations and mischaracterizations of law.
Finally, Gillett's appeal is so bereft of argument supported by law that it has
placed a disproportionate burden on the opposing party and this Court to both
decipher what arguments are being made by Gillett and to determine what, if
any, support can be found for the contentions within relevant case law only to
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also research and argue against these points as well as provide legal argument in
support of the trial court's already detailed ruling.
Thus, pursuant to Rule 33(a), if the Court determines that an appeal is
frivolous, uit shall award just damages, which may include single or double
costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/ or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the •.
party's attorney." Utah R. App. P. Rule 33. The Supreme Court of Utah granted a
motion for sanctions on an appeal taken from claims dismissed by the trial court
on summary judgment after the trial court had stated the plaintiff1s claims
bordered on being frivolous and the plaintiff failed to defend the motion for
sanctions. Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265, 1272 (Utah 1998).
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. Rule 34, "Except as otherwise provided by
law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless
otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is
affirmed, costs shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered ... "
Utah R. App. P. Rule 34 (2015). This Court may award appellee costs under this
rule even if Gillett' s appeal is not found to be frivolous. See Colony Ins. Co. v.
Human Ensemble, LLC, 2013 UT App 68, 299 P.3d 465. Thus, because Gillett' s Brief

and/ or Appeal are deficient, meritless, and/ or frivolous, attorney fees and costs
should be awarded to Defendant/ Appellees.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of
Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment, and award
Defendants/ Appellees the attorney's fees they have incurred on appeal.
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ORDER TRANSFERRING REVIEW TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
(R.963-66)

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURT~

AUG -5 2014
IN 1HE SUPREME COURT OF 1HE STATE OF UTAH
-oo0ooDavid K. Gillett, an individual
and Majestic Airlines, Inc., a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 20140682-SC
080921211

v.

Boyd J. Brown, an individual;
Sentry Financial Corporation,
a Utah corporation; and SFC
Aircraft Corp I, a Utah corporation;
Defendants and Appellees.

ORDER
Pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this matter will be
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition unless a timely request for
retention (as detailed below) is received. This order may also be superseded by another
order directing an immediate transfer if the Court deems such a transfer to be
appropriate. Following transfer, all further pleadings and correspondence should be
directed to the Court of Appeals.
Within ten calendar days of the date of this order, any party to the appeal may submit a
letter to the Supreme Court concerning the appropriateness of retaining the matter on
its own docket. The letter may request retention or may request transfer. The letter
shall contain the following four categories of information, preceded by a heading
describing each category:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The name of the case and the appellate case number,
~e names of all parties involved in the case and the attorneys and firms
representing the parties,
A concise statement of the issues presented on appeal, and
A brief explanation of the reasons supporting retention or transfer.

The Checklist for Appellate Jurisdiction (included with notice of this order) must also
be completed and returned with any letter requesting retention. Failure to complete
and return the cl1ecklist will preclude consideration of a request for retention.
The letter and checklist may not be combined with any other document or pleading.
The letter shall not exceed five pages (excluding the checklist) and must be received
with.in ten calendar days of the date of this order. The Court will not consider any
letter requesting retention that is received after the ten-day deadline. In the event the
deadline falls on a weekend or holiday, the letter must be received by the first business
day thereafter.
Any response to a timely letter requesting retention must be filed with this Court with.in
seven calendar days of service of that letter. The response may not exceed five pages.
In the event the matter is transferred by superseding order prior to expiration of the
deadline, an otherwise timely request for retention will be treated as a request for recall
from the Court of Appeals.

FOR THE COURT:

ndrea R. Martinez
Clerk of Court

CERTIFICATE OF SER\11CE
.

. .

.

I hereby certify that on August('.)- , 2014;, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER was sent by electronic mail to be delivered to:
STEPHEN G. HOMER
shomerlaw@netzero,com
CHRISTOPHER M. AULT
chris@aultlegal.com
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: JULIE RIGBY AND CHERYL AIONO
450 S STATE ST BX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
chery la@utcourts.gov, julier@utcourts.gov

Judicial Assistant
Case No. 20140682-SC
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 080921211

Checklist for Appellate Jurisdiction
(If a request for retention is submitted, this form rnust be returned with that request and must provide all applicable
infonnation or the request for retention will uot be considered by the Court. Any additional infonnation relevant to
jurisdiction may be included in the letter requesting retention)
The case number in the lower court _ _ _ _ _ _ __
The date the final judgment was entered or, if the time for appeal was reinstated pursuant to Subparts (f)
or (g) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the date of reinstatement _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
The date of the filing of the appeal to which this retention request is directed _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Whether any other appeals or cross-appeals in the same case have been filed: Yes
The date(s) of those appeal(s)

No __.

Whether the judgment listed above resolved the case as to all claims and parties: Yes

No __

If no, whether the judgment was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure: Yes
No
. List the date of certification _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Whether the judgment listed above included a ruling concerning attorney fees: Yes

No

If attorney fees were awarded at any time, whether the amounts of all awards of fees were fixed prior to
the date of your latest appeal: Yes__ No__ Not Applicable _ _ . List the date of the last order
fixing the fees: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Whether Rule 4(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure is applicable: Yes

No __

If yes, list the date of any motion listed in Rule 4(b) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and the date of
resolution of that motion _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Whether Rule 4(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure is applicable: Yes

No __

Whether Rule 7(£)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure has been satisfied (see CUWCD. v. King, 2013 UT 13):
Yes_._ No __ Not Applicable _ _ .

If yes, list the date of the order satisfying Rule 7(£)(2) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If no, list any actions that have been taken to comply with the requirements of Rule 7(f)(2):

Whether the time to file the appeal was extended: Yes__ No __ . List the date of any motion for
an extension _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and the date of the order extending the time _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Whether the appeal was filed pursuant to Utah Code§ 78B-11-129: Yes__ No
subsection(s) of that provision that is (are) applicable: _ _ _ __

If yes, list the

The statutory provision conferring appellate jurisdiction on this Court - ie., the applicable subsection of
Utah Code§ 78A-3-102 ( _ _ _ _ )
(rev. 1/2014)

ADDENDUMB
ORDER FROM HEARING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[HEARING HELD DECEMBER 16r 2013]
(R.913-15)

The Order of Court is stated below:
Dated: April 13, 2014
Isl L. A

11:03:lOPM

Christopher M. Ault, # 11000
Zachary W. Powell, #14756
THE AULT FIRM, P.C.
8817 S. Redwood Rd., Ste. A
West Jordan, UT 84088
Telephone: (801) 539-9000
Facsimile: (801) 207-1056
Email: zachary@aultlegal.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID K. GILLETT, an individual, and
MAJESTIC AIRLINES,
INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
V.

BOYD J. BROWN, an individual, SENTRY
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah
Corporation, and SFC AIRCRAFT CORP I,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER FROM HEARING ON
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
(December 16, 2013)

Civil No.: 080921211
Judge L.A. Dever

COMES NOW the Court, having held a hearing on the parties' Motions for Summary
Judgment on December 16, 2013, with Plaintiff represented by Steven Homer and Defendants
represented by Christopher M. Ault and Zachary W. Powell, having considered the parties'
motions, memoranda, declarations, and arguments made by counsel, and for good cause
showing,
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that:

Page
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1. Plaintiff Majestic is no longer a viable corporation, Majestic's winding-up period
has expired, and Majestic may not assert any claims.
2. Plaintiff Gillett is the successor in interest and has the right to assert Majestic's
claims.
3. The statute oflimitations for Plaintiff's cause of action offraud expired in 2005.
4. Plaintiffs filed this case in 2008.
5. Even considering the savings statute, Plaintiff failed to file his cause of action of
fraud within the statute of limitations, and all Plaintiff's fraud claims are
dismissed with prejudice.
6. The statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years.
7. Gillett and/or Majestic breached its contract with Sentry in 1995, and the statute
of limitations ran in 2001.
8. Concealment is at issue, but the alleged concealment was a concealment of fraud.
The statute of limitations for the concealment is therefore tolled until 2002, and
the statute of limitations for the concealed fraud expired in 2005.
9. The parties signed a valid release of all claims in 1996. All claims are thereby
released except for Plaintiff's claim of fraud, which was discovered in 2002. The
statute of limitations for fraud expired in 2005.
10. The Court dismisses with prejudice all claims asserted by Plaintiff in this matter.

The Court's Signature and Date ofEntry of this Order Appear on the First Page of this
Document.

Page
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NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF AND COUNSEL
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
any objections you have to this proposed order must be filed with the Court within 5 days of
service of this proposed order.

DATED this 19th day of March, 2014.
THE AULT FIRM, P.C.
Isl Zachary W Powell
Zachary W. Powell

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the forgoing document was served via
electronic filing, this 19th day of March, 2014, to the following:

Stephen G. Homer
2877 West 9150 South
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Isl Zachary W. Powell
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•
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ADDENDUMC ·
RULING ON GILLETT'S RULE 59 AND RULE 60(b) MOTIONS
(R.946-56)

•
•

•

•

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH

cou~
DISTR1cr
1rd

DAVID K. GILLETT, an individual, and
MAJESTIC AIRLINES, INC., a Utah
corporation,

JUdfo/a/ ofOURr
Strfct

BAt.:r~

14
~

RULING
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 080921211

BOYD J. BROWN, an individual,
SENTRY FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and SFC AIRCRAFT
CORP I, a Utah corporation,

Judge: L.A. DEVER

Defendants.
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Notice to Submit for
Decision their Rule 59(b) Motion for New Trial and Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and, Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Judgment and this Court's entry
thereof, filed April 29, 2014. Having reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion and Objection and
Defendants' Oppositions thereto, and being duly advised in the premises of the matters
before it, the Court makes the following Ruling.
Background
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 29, 2008. The following are
relevant claims as asserted by Plaintiffs in their Complaint:
1.

Defendant Boyd J. Brown was, at the time of the filing of the Complaint, a
resident of Wyoming. (Campi. ,I 3).

2.

However, at all relevant times, Mr. Brown was a resident of Salt Lake
County, Utah. Id. at ,I 4.

3.

Defendants Sentry Financial Corporation ("Sentry") and SFC Aircraft Corp
I ("SFC"), are Utah corporations, with headquarters in Salt Lake County,
Utah. Id. at 1[1J 4-5.

4.

Jurisdiction, both subject matter and personal, are appropriate before this
Court. Id. at

5.

1J 7.

Plaintiffs; causes of action include: (1) Breach of Contract against Mr.
•Brown, id. at
id. at

1J1J 47-48; (2) Breach of Contract against Sentry and SFC,

ffll 49-50; (3) Fraud against Mr. Brown,

Accounting, id. at

id. at

,m 51-58; (4) Judicial

ffll 59-60; and (5) Declaratory Judgment,

id. at

ffll 61-

63.
6.

In 1994, Plaintiff Majestic Airlines ("Majestic") 1 entered into a contract with
Defendant(s) Sentry and/or SFC. Id. at

1J 13. See also (Defs.' Opp. To

Pis.' Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot.
For Summ. J. vi-x).
7.

In or about March 1995, Majestic was in default on the terms of
agreement it had with Sentry. Id. at

8.

1J 19.

Plaintiffs allege that they were unaware of Sentry's receipt of Mr. Brown's
$250,0002 , payment until "March 2002 when such payment was disclosed
during the deposition of Sentry officials[.]" Id. at ,I 44; see also ,r 50.
Compare (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In

1

Majestic has been dissolved as a company since in or about April 1996. (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.'
Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. x, ffll 24-25).
2

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Complaint, this alleged payment occurred after Majestic had defaulted the
terms of the agreement at issue, in or about July 1995. Id. at ,r 25.
2

Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. 1-16).
9.

On December 6, 1996, the parties entered into a release agreement in
which Plaintiffs released all their claims against Defendants. ld_. at 1142.
See Compare (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In
Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. Ex. F).

10.

Plaintiffs also allege that they did not "discover" Mr. Brown's alleged
.
.
fraud 31 i.e., allegedly fraudulently inducing Plaintiffs to sign the release, id.
at '1J1J 56-57, until the "March 2002 deposition of Jonathan Ruga, SFC
Aircraft I[.]" Id. at

1'f 53. Compare (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For Part.

Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. 1-16).
Following a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on
December 16, 2013, the Court held:
(1)

Majestic is not a proper party to the entitled matter as it was dissolved as
a corporation in or about April 1996. Therefore, the true party in interest is
Plaintiff David K. Gillett.

(2)

Plaintiffs' were the first party to breach 4 the contract at issue in 1995 and
therefore, the six (6) year statute of limitations expired in 2001. Utah

3

Again, pursuant to Plaintiffs' Complaint, the alleged fraud "in violation of [Mr. Brown's] own
contractual obligations" in or about April 1996, occurred well after Majestic's breach of the contract. Id. at

1f 40.
See §...9... CCD, LC. v. Millsap. 2005 UT 42, ,r 29, 116 P.3d 366 ("We have explained that under
the 'first breach' rule a party first guilty of a substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if
the other party thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on performance by the other party nor
maintain an action against the other party for a subsequent failure to perform." (citations and quotations
omitted)); Saunders v. Sharp. 840 P.2d 796, 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that "a party committing
a substantial breach of a contract cannot maintain an action against the other contracting party ... for a
subsequent failure to perform if the promises are dependent." (citation omitted)).
4

3

Code Ann. §788-2-309(2) (2008). See also (Defs.' Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For
1

Part. Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs. Counter Mot. For Summ. J.
Exs. A5 , 8 6 ).
(3)

Although concealment is at issue, the concealment pertains to
Defendants' alleged fraud inducing Plaintiffs to sign the release in
December 1996, which Plaintiffs alleged to not have discovered until
March 2002. (Compl.
(a)

1I'fl 53, 56-57).

Because the alleged fraud was claimed to be discovered by
Plaintiffs in March 2002, Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action, Fraud
against Mr. Brown ran in March 2005. Moreover, Plaintiffs' June
2007 case 070409723, filed in West Jordan, did not save or

5

The April 29, 1994 Letter Agreement, subsection 10 provides in relevant part:
In the event of a breach by MAI (Majestic], Gillett or Boyd of any of these terms or
conditions of the Sentry Loan Documents, MAI, Gillett and Boyd jointly and
severally agree to pay all of Sentry's costs and expenses incurred with the
breach[.]

(emphasis added}.
6

The Guarantee and Waiver signed by Mr. Brown, which outlines the obligations and rights of Mr.
Brown and Sentry, respectively, provides in relevant part:
(b) Sentry may at any time and from time to time ... upon or without any terms or
conditions and in whole or in part: ... (2) sell, exchange, release, surrender,
realize upon or otherwise deal with in any manner and in any order any property
by whomsoever at any time pledged or mortgaged to secure, or howsoever
securing the Liabilities of the Obliger [Majestic] hereby guaranteed ... (4) settle
or compromise any Liabilities of the Obliger hereby guaranteed, any security
thereof, or any liability (including those hereunder) incurred directly or indirectly in
respect or hereof, and may subordinate the payment of all or any part thereof to
the payment of any liability {whether due or not} of the Obliger to creditors of the
Obliger other than Sentry and the undersigned; and (5) apply any sums by
whomsoever paid or howsoever realized to any and all Liabilities of the Obligor to
Sentry regardless of what liability or Liabilities of the Obliger remain unpaid.
{emphasis added).
4

otherwise preserve Plaintiffs' fraud claim because it was still filed
two (2) years after the three (3) year statute of limitations had run.
See Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-305(3) (2008); see also Hom v. Utah
Dep't of Pub. Safety. 962 P.2d 95, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
(4)

In order to set aside the December 1996 Mutual Release ("Release"),
Plaintiffs' were required to have filed their Third Cause of Action, Fraud
against Mr. Brown, no later than March 2005, which was three (3) years
after the Plaintiffs allegedly discovered said fraud in March 2002. Having
failed to timely file any fraud claim until 2007, the Release therefore
appropriately applies to Plaintiffs' remaining claims.
Analysis and Discussion

1

Plaintiffs Rule 59(b) and 60(b) Motion

On March 15, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Rule 59(b) and 60(b) Motion. Although
the docket reflects that Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in support, the memorandum is
the exact same as the original Motion. That is, both documents are approximately
three (3) pages long and do not provide any legal support, analysis, or discussion. The
Court finds that Plaintiffs' arguments, as reflected in the Motion, are untenable.
First, Plaintiffs assert that "the Court misapprehended (and thus overlooked" the
true 'contractually-based' nature of the Plaintiffs' claim (against SENTRY) and instead
improperly converted Plaintiffs' claims to allege 'fraud,' for which a shorter statute of

7

("Simple ignorance of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the
running of the statute of limitations. All that is required to trigger the statute of limitations is ... sufficient
information to ... put [plaintiffs] on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions."
(citations and quotations omitted)).
5

limitation would apply." (Pis.' R. 59{b) and 60(b) Mot. 2). This claim is inconsistent with
the Court's December 16, 2013, ruling, in which the Court specifically found that the
contractual claims, i.e., Plaintiffs' first and second causes of action, were barred by the
six (6) year statute of limitations as Plaintiffs themselves asserted, they breached the
terms of the April 1994 Letter Agreement in mid-1995 but did not file any suit until June
2007. See supra at 4. See also fn. 4.

· Plaintiffs also assert that the Court failed to consider Utah Code Annotated
Section 788-2-1048 in its consideration of Plaintiffs' fraud claim against Mr. Brown.
Although Plaintiffs specifically cite Section 788-2-104 in its Motion, following
Defendants' Opposition, Plaintiffs, in their Reply, assert that the pre-2008 amended
version, Section 78-12-35 9 is applicable. The Court finds that under either version
Plaintiffs' claim that Mr. Brown's out-of-state resident status tolls the statute limitations
fails .
. In signing the April 29, 1994, Letter Agreement and Guarantee and Waiver, Mr.
Brown consented to resolve all matters in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Third Judicial

8

States:

If a cause of action accrues against a person while the person is out of the state
and the person is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state in accordance
with Section 78B-3-205; the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this
chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues the person departs
from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action unless Section 788-3-205 applies.
(emphasis added).
9

States:

Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state,
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return to
the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his
absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
6

District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (Defs. 1 Opp. To Pis.' Mot. For Part.
Summ. J. and Mem. In Supp. of Defs.' Counter Mot. For Summ. J. Exs. A at ,I12, Bat

11 i). Neither party disputes the validity of the noted forum

selection clauses.

In instances in which there is an enforceable forum selection clause, "[only] a
'rational nexus' between Utah and the underlying dispute [must be shown]. This nexus
need not meet the more rigorous minimum contacts standard utilized in those cases
where a forum selection clause is not present." Jacobsen Const. Co .• Inc. v. Teton
Builders, 2005 UT 4, ,I32, 106 P.3d 719 (citing Phone Directories Co., Inc. v.
Henderson, 2000 UT 64,

,r 1410, 8 .P.3d 256).

Accordingly, this Court concludes that the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction
clause in the parties' contract, specifying Utah as the appropriate jurisdiction to resolve
claims under the contract, creates a rebuttable presumption that the trial court has
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Brown. See Jacobsen Const. Co., 2005 UT at ,r 39
(holding that "forum selection clauses need not make specific mention of a consent to
jurisdiction when the language of the clause makes the parties' intention to resolve
disputes in a particular forum evident.") See also Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726
1

(Utah Ct.App.1990) (stating that ' defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived"
(citation omitted)). The Court also finds that the record before it establishes the
10

Explaining:

In particular, we hold that, while a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause by itself is
not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant as a matter of law, such
clauses do create a presumption in favor of jurisdiction and will be upheld as fair and
reasonable so long as there is a rational nexus between the forum selected and/or
consented to, and either the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the subject
matter of the contract. Although the rational nexus element does require some connection
between Utah and either the parties to or the actions contemplated by the contract, it
need not rise to the level required under section [78B-3-205].
1

necessary rational nexus11: (1) At the time of contracting, Plaintiff, Majestic was a Utah
corporation, with its business headquarters in Salt Lake County, (Compl.1f 2); (2) At the
time of contracting, Defendant, Mr. Brown was a resident of Salt Lake County, Id. at ,r
3; (3) Defendant, Sentry is a Utah corporation, with its business headquarters in Salt
Lake County, Id. at 1J 4; {4) Defendant, SFC is a Utah corporation, with its business
headquarters in Salt Lake County, Id. at 1J 5; and, (5) In or about March 1995, Majestic
· was in default on the terms of agreement it had with Sentry, both Utah corporations. Id.
at 1f 19.
In regards to Section 78-12-35, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have misconstrued
the statutory language and therefore, the purpose of the provision.
First, Section 78-12-35, specifically addresses the tolling of time for the
commencement of an action. It clearly states:

Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the
state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this
chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he
departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time
limited for the commencement of the action.
(2007)(emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court explained "that the objective of ...
[78-12-35] was to prevent a defendant from depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of
suing him by absenting himself from the state during the period of limitation." Snyder v.
Clune, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (Utah 1964). Highlighting the purpose of the statute at issue,
in the matter of Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, 158 P.3d 532, the court held that

11

Explaining that the rational nexus "operates as a safety valve, providing a mechanism whereby
Utah courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction when Utah has no real interest in the outcome of a given
dispute." Id. at ,r 41.
8

because defendant was an out-of-state defendant whom plaintiff was unable to locate
at the time she attempted to serve her second amended complaint, which then was
outside of the applicable statute of limitations, the statute of limitations was tolled. Id. at
1f112-7 (holding "section 78-12-35 ... does toll the applicable statute of limitations
when a person against_whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah and has no

agent within the state upon whom service of process can be made, even where the
person was at all times amenable to service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute."
(emphasis added)).
Unlike the matter in Olseth, Plaintiffs knew that "[in] the mid-1990s Mr. Brown
relocated his permanent residence ... to Teton County, Wyoming, where he has
continuously maintained his permanent legal residence and domicile." (Gillett Aff. at ,i
3). Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 29, 2008, (Compl.) and served Mr.
Brown in Wyoming. (Pis.' Reply 2). Plaintiffs have never claimed that they were unable
to locate Mr. Brown in order to appropriately serve him or, that Mr. Brown's absence
from Utah deprived them of their ability to timely commence the entitled matter.
Compare Olseth, 2007 UT at fflf 3-7. Plaintiffs solely argue that they were required to
serve Mr. Brown in Wyoming and that there was an extended period of time in
attempting to take Mr. Brown's deposition. (Pis.' Reply at 2-3). The fact that Mr. Brown
was served in Wyoming and the alleged inconvenience of Plaintiffs in attempting to
timely depose Mr. Brown does not invoke Section 78-12-35 and therefore, does not toll
the statute of limitations of Plaintiffs' breach of contract and fraud claims. See Tracey
v. Blood, 3 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah 1931) ("Apparently all courts are agreed .. that the
burden was upon the plaintiff to plead and prove facts sufficient to toll the statute of
9

limitations[.]")).
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Rule 59(b) and 60(b) Motion is DENIED.
2

Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Prepared Judgment

The Court finds that Defendants' proposed Order- submitted March 19, 2014,
and entered by this Court on April 13, 2014, as the Order of the Court - is consistent
with the Court's ruling on December 16, 2013.
Moreover, Plaintiffs' "objections" are merely a veiled attempt to take a second
bite at the apple and are therefore, OVERRULED.
Accordingly, the Order entered April 13, 2014, is HEREBY AFFIRMED.

This Ruling stands as the Order of the Court. No further order is required.

Dated this 24th day of June, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling dated this

:.J 5'

day of June, 2014, was issued via either electronic or standard mail to the following:

Christopher M. Ault
Zachary W. Powell
THE AULT FIRM, PC
8817 South Redwood Road, Suite A
West Jordan, UT 84088
Stephen G. Homer
2877 West 9150 South
West Jordan, UT 84088

CLERK OF COURT
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ADDENDUMD
UTAH CODE§ 78B-2-104

78B-2-104. Effect of absence from state.
If a cause of action accrues against a person while the person is out of the state

and the person is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state in
accordance with Section 78B-3-205, the action may be commenced within the
term as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of
action accrues the person departs from the state, the time of his absence is not
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action unless Section 78B-3205 applies.
Utah Code. Ann.§ 78B-2-104 (2009)

•
•

•
•
ADDENDUME
UTAH CODE§ 78B-2-305

•
•
•
•
I

I

78B-2-305. Within three years.

An action may be brought within three years:
(1) for waste, trespass upon, or injury to real property; except that when waste
or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining
claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the waste or trespass;
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for
specific recovery; except that in cases where the subject of the action is a
domestic animal usually included in the term "livestock," which at the time
of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if the animal strayed or was stolen
from the true owner without the owner's fa ult, the cause does not accrue
until the owner has actual knowledge of facts that would put a reasonable
person upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the defendant;
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action
does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake;
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a
different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state; or

(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78B-3-603, or for damages under
Section 78B-6-1701, except that the cause of action does not accrue until the
aggrieved party knows or reasonably should know of the harm suffered.
Utah Code. Ann. § 78B-2-305 (2010).

•
•
•
•
ADDENDUMF

•
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•
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 56

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 21 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary
judgment upon all or any part thereof.

(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the

pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief
is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this ·
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file

such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a

party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party 1s opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court
shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be
adjudged guilty of contempt.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (2014).
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LETTER AGREEMENT
(R.299-302)

(

sFCC, I~JSi!:!:!. !IN~~flt~i}~~~r.?i~TION

ORIG!t~AL

Telephone; (801) 596--9600 Telefax (801) 596-9630

.Jonathan M. Rugs

as of April 29, 1994
HAND-DELIVERED

I
Mr. David K. Gillett.
President

MAJESTIC AIRLINES, INC.
180 North 2400 West
Salt (.ake City, UT 84116
RE:

$483,102.43 loan (·Loan·) made by Sentry Financial Corporation ("'Sentry~) to
Majestic Airlines, Inc. (·MA1•1

Oear 1Dave,
This letter agreement replaces and supersedes the Commitment Letter and Amendment each dated
April 29, 1994 among Sentry, MAI, Boyd J. Brown i-Brown") and David K. Gillett (•Gillett•). Sentry,
MAI; Brown, Gillett and Majestic Holding, Inc. t·MHr) {collectively the ·Parties") agree as follows:
1.

Sentry will pay the sum of $454,021.99 to Textron Financial Corporation ("TFC"l and
TFC will assign all of TFC's right, title and interest in and to (al four (4) Promissory
Notes issued by MAI payable to TFC each dated December 15, 1992 in the following
original principal amounts $116,814.28 (s/n U-33, N433SA), $116,814.28 (s/n U-35,
N336PL), $133,596.83 (s/n U-88, N7899R), and $133,596.83 (s/n U-94, N9FH)
(collectively the "Notes"); (bl Aircraft Security Agreement dated July 30, 1994
1·Textron Security Agreement•) between MAI and TFC; (c) Guaranty dated July 30,
1994 rParent Guaranty•) of Majestic Holding Inc. to TFC; and (dl Guaranty dated July
30, 1994 ("Guaranty") of David K. Gillett to TFC. The Notes, the Textron Security
Agreement, the Guaranty the Parent Guaranty all other documents and agreements
related thereto shall hereinafter collectively be referred to as the "Loan Documents".
The four Beechcrart BE-99 aircraft, bearing FAA registration numbers N7899R, NSFH,
N336PL and N433SA and serial numbers U-88, U-94, U-35 and U-33 shall collectively
with all related equipment be referred to as the "Aircraft".

2.

MAI and Gillett represent and warrant to Sentry that: (al anached hereto as Exhibit B
are true and correct copies of the loan Documents; (bl the Loan Documents constitute
all of the documents relating to MAi's financing with TFC; le) the Loan Documents are
valid, binding and enforceable in accordance with their terms; and (di t.he Loan
Documents create a valid, first priority security interest in favor of Sentry in four
Beechcraft BE-99 aircraft, bearing FAA registration numbers N7899R, N9FH, N336PL
and N433SA and serial numbers U-88, U-94, U-35 and U-33 (collectively with all
related equipment the "Equipmeni-).

3.

MAI will execute and deliver a Security Agreement (" Additional Security Agreement")
in a form acceptable to Sentry granting Sentry a security interest in additional collateral
described therein as further security for the Loan.

4.

Brown, Gillett and MHI will each execute and deliver a Guarantee and Waiver (in a form
acceptable to Sentry) of all of MAi's obligations to Sentry under the Loan Documents,
this Agreement, the Additional Security Agreement and all documents contemplated
thereby or hereby (collectively the "Sentry Loan Documents"). In consideration for

...
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Mr. David K. Gillett
as of April 29, 1994
Page 2
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Brown executing and delivering the Guarantee and Waiver, MAI will pay Brown
of $20,000.

a fee

5.

In consideration of Sentry agreeing to purchase the TFC Loan Documents from TFC,
MAI shall pay to Sentry Ion or before May 31, 1994) a loan origination fee of
$9,080.44. MAI, Gillett, Brown and MHI have requested and Sentry has agreed to
fund the loan origination fee and the guarantee fee to Brown by increasing the amount
of the Loan by $29,080.44 to $483,102.43.

6.

The repayment terms of the Loan Documents shall be changed as follows: la) the
outstanding principal amount of the Loan shall be increased to $483,102.43; Cb) MAI
shall repay the Loan in advance. in 36 equal monthly payments of $15,779.57 (each
a•Monthly Payment"), payable on the first day of each month commencing on July 1,
1994 and continuing through June 1, 1997; and Cc) MAI shall make an interim payment
(due on or before July 1, 19941 of $30,654.66 for the period from the date hereof
through June 30, 1994.

7.

In the event the Aircraft or any one them is destroyed, damaged beyond repair, lost,
stolen, or taken by government action for an indefinite period or for a stated period
extending beyond June 30, 1997 (each an "Event of Loss"), MAI must promptly notify
Sentry and pay to Sentry, as the case may be, on the date the Monthly Payment is due
and payable following the Event of Loss, an amount equal to the Casualty Value set
forth in Exhibit A. If the Event of Loss _is in respect of some but not all of the Aircraft,
the amount of the payment to Sentry shall be a fraction of the Casualty Value, the
numerator of which is the original principal amount of the Notets) by TFC issued in
respect of such destroyed or lost Aircraft and the denominator of which is
$500,822.22.

8.

MAI shall have the right to prepay the Loan at any time upon thirty days wrinen notice
to Sentry. In the event the Loan has not been repaid in full on or before October 1,
1994 the Monthly Payment shall be increased to $ 16,430.33. In the event the Loan
has not been repaid in full on or before January 1, 1995 the Monthly Payment shall be
increased to $17,201.20.

9.

All payments made by MAI to Sentry shall be made at 201 S. Main Street, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111-2115, unless notified·of a change in writing by Sentry.

10.

In the event of a breach by MAI, Gillen or Boyd of any of the terms or conditions of the
Sentry Loan Documents, MAI, Gillett and Boyd jointly and severally agree to pay all of
Sentry's costs and expenses incurred in connection with the breach and/or the
enforcement of any of the Sentry Loan Documents including, without limitation,
reasonable attorneys' fees.

11.

For the avoidance of doubt, the Textron Security Agreement shall secure all of MAi's
obligations hereunder.

12.

Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, this agreement and all other Sentry Loan

...
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i
Documents shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the
State of Utah (without giving effect to principles relating to conflicts of laws). The
Parties hereby consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tt)ird Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah c•court•), for a determination of any,dispute as to
any matters hereunder and authorizes service of process by the Court for a determination of any dispute as to any such matters by service of process on the Parties by
certified or registered mail sent to Lessee at the address referred to _in Section 19 lb)
above. If the Third Judicial District Court set forth above does not have jurisdiction to
hear and decide the matter before it, the Parties consent to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Federal District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division; provided,
however, that nothing herein shall preclude Sentry if it thinks fit, from instituting
proceedings against any or all of the Parties in any country or place which may have
jurisdiction for the purpose of protecting and enforcing Sentry's rights either hereunder
or under any other Sentry Loan Agreements, documents, 1 instruments or otherwise.
Sincerely,

rJ=.7n.Ko/
/ thief Executive Officer

Accepted and Agreed to as of
this ~9th day of April, 1994.

~

MAJESTIC AIRLINES, INC.

By.-~#9W

David K. Gillett, pers nally

Name: David K. Gillett
Title: President

MAJESTIC HOLDING, INC.

By:~tlar

Name: David K. Gillen
Title: I President
i

...
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CASUALTY VALUES

EXHIBIT A
to LETTER AGREEMENT dated as of April 29, 1994
among
SENTRY FINANCIAL CORPORATION, MAI, BOYD BROWN, and DAVID K. GILLETT

The Casualty Value of the Aircraft is the percentage of $483,102.43 set forth opposite
the applicable loan payment
·

AFTER
LOAN PAYMENT
NUMBER

AFTER
LOAN PAYMENT
NUMBER

CASUALTY
VALUE
100.00%
97.65%
95.29%
92.94%
90.59%
88.24%
85.88%
83.53%
81.18%
78.82%
76.47%
74.12%
71.76%
69.41%
67.06°/4
64.71%
62.35%
60.000A.

8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18

VALUE

---------- ---------

---------- --------1
2
3
4
5
6
7

CASUALTY

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28
29

30
31
32
33
34

35
36

57.78%
55.56°/4
53.33%
51.11%
48.89"/4
46.67%
44.44%
42.22%
40.000A.
37.78%
35.56%
33.33%
31.11%
26.89%
26.67%
24.44%
22.22%
20.00%

...
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ADDENDUMH

•

BROWN GUARANTY AND WAIVER
(R.304-06)

•

(

(
GUARANTEE AND WAIVER

of $483, 102..43 Loon
mado by SENTRY FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
a Utah col'l)Orotion, to
MAJESTIC AIRLINES, INC., 111 Ulah corporation

&ckground
Sontry RMncial Corporation, 111 Utah corporation. rsontry"I, modo o loan in tho amount of t483, 102.43 to Majestic Airiinos,
lnc •• 11 Utoh corpor11tion ("MAI") o'olidoncod by four 141 Promi1111ory Notos iesuod by MAI poyllblo to Toxtron fillllncilll Corporation
rTFC"I 011ch dated Oocombor 15, 1992 in tho following original principal 1111'1\0Unta $116,814.28 a/n U-33, N433SA),
$1 t 6,814.28 (a{n lJ.35, N336PU, $133,596.83 (sin U-88, N7899RI, end $133,596.83' 111/n U•94, N9FHI (colloctivoly tho
"Notos"J. Tho Notes woro aocurod by an Aircraft Security Agroomont dstod July 30, 1994 C-Security Agroomont"I botwoon
MA1 1and TFC. Th<, Notos, tho Security Agroomont ond 1111 rolatod documents ("TFC Loan Documonts") wore aalligned to Sentry
by TFC puraucmt to an A.isignmont dotod as of May 2. 1994 Aasignmont•). Tho TFC Loan Documants woro modifiod by a
lonot agroomont d11tod as of April 29. 1994 C-Lottor Agroomont•J among MAI. Sentry, Boyd J. Brown [•Brown•) and Dovid K.
Gillett ("Gillott"J. Tho TfC Locn Documonts as nsignod to Sentry pursuant to tho Assignment and moditiod by tho Lonur
Agroomont ahl!ll! horoinaftor bo rofo,rod to as tho rLoan Documonts"I.

r

(al In order to induco Sentry to maka 1ho Loon and ontor into the Loan Documonts to which it is a parry, and to
othor.wiso oxtond credit or financial oecommodationa to MAI {"Obligor"I. ond for other QOod ond vllluoblo considorotion, tho
rocaipt. odoquacy, ond logo! aufficial'ICy of which oro horaby 11clmowlodgod. tho undorsignod (tho ~Guarantor") horoby irrevocably
and ~nconditionally guarantoos end promiuos to and for Iha banofil of Sentry, Its auccos11ors and assigns, poymont ond
por1ormanco whon duo, whothor by oecoforotion or othorwi11a, of ·any ond oil Uebllitios of th<, Obligor to Sontry arising from or
in connoction with tho loon Documents. Tho tonn "Uabilitios of tho Obligor· is usod horoin in its most comprohonsivo sonse
end shell indudo, but is not limitod to. oll lillbilitios, debts and obligations, voluntary or involuntary, diroct or Indirect, absolute
01 coiltingent, joint, sovoral or indopondont, of the Obligor. now or horooftor oxisting, duo or to bocoms due, whothar c1osted
dirocdy or acquired by ossignmont or othorwiso, arising from 01 in connection with tho Loon Documonts, whothor such
indobtodnoss moy bo or ha1oohor bocomo barred by ony 11t11tuto of limitations or whothor such indobtodnoss may be or horoaftor
bocomc othorwiso unonlorcosblo. This is II continuing guaranty relating to all indobtodnoss of tho Obligor to Sentry, including
that o~sing under succossivo Equipment Schodul0$ and loaso ond/or loon uanssctions. In addition, tho Guarantor agroos to
indorrinily, hold harmless and dofond Sentry against any loss, domago, or liability boceuso of any wrongful acts or fraud of tho
Obligor arising lrom or in coMOC'lion with tho loan Documents.
(bl· Tho Guarantor l)oroby wnivos notico of occoptanca of this Guarontoo and Waivor ond notico of ony liability to which it
may apply, ond waivos diligonco, prosontmont. damood for poymont arid porformanco, protest, notico of dishonor or nonpayment
of any 1such liabilitios or nonporformenco. suit or taking of other oction by Sonny against. and any othor notice to, any party liable
thoroon (including tho Obligo1 and Guarontorl and woivos ony dolanso, otfsot, rocoupmonl, reduction, or countorclaim for or on
account of 11ny roason or avant whatovor to 11ny li8bility of tho Guoron1or haroundor. Sentry moy 01 ony timo end from limo to
limo (whothor or not 11hor revocation or tonnination of this Guarantoo and Waivol) without tho consent of, or notice to the
Guare~tor, without incurring responsibility to tho Guarantor, without impairing or rolaasing, in ony manner whatsoovor, the
obliostions of tho Guarantor horoundor, upon or without any terms or conditions and in whole or in pan: 11) ranew, modify,
amand, compromiso. oxtond. occolorato, disch!lfgo or othorwieo change trni manner, placo, or torms.of paymont and/or change
or axte'nd the time of paymcmt of, renew or Bltor, any and all Usbilitios of the Obligor, any socurity tharcfor, or any liability
incurre~ directly or indirectly in 1ospoct thoraof, and tho guorantoo heroin mado shall apply to tho Uebilitios of tho Obligor as so
changed, olCtondad, ronowod or ohorod; (2) soU, oxchango, rolaoso. surrondar, roalizo upon or othorwiao doal with in any manner
ond in liny ardor any proporty by whomsoovor at any tima plodgod or mongagod to secure, or howsoovar socuring tho Liabilities
of 1ha Obligor horoby guer11ntoad or ony liebilitios !including any of thoso haraundorl incurred diroctly or indirocdy in rospoct
thorootlor horoof, 11nd/or offsat thoreagainst; 13) oxorciso or rolrain lrom 11xorcising any rights against tho Obligor or othors
!including tho Guarontorl or othorwiso oct or rolrain from octing; 141 10ttlo or compromiao any Uabili'lios of tho Obligor horaby
guarontoad, ony security !horofor, or any liahility (including any of thouo horaundorl incurrod directly or indiroctly in rospoct
thorool or hereof. and mey subordin11to tho payment of all or ony p11rt thoroof to tho poymont ot 11ny liability (whothor duo or
natl ol tho Obligor to croditor11 of tho Obligor other than Sontry ond tho undorsignod; and (SI apply any IUms by whomso11ver
pajd or ~owsoovor roalizod lo any ond all Liabilitioo of tho Obligor to Sentry rogordlaGS of what liability or Uabilitioa of tho Obligor
remain inpoid.
(cl No inval"ldity, irrogularity or unonforcoooility of all 01 any part of tho Uobililioe of Obligor haroby guorantaod or ol any
aocuri1yjthorofor shall elfoct, impnir, or ba o dolons:o to thiu Guor0t1tao and Waivor. Thi, liability of tho Guarantor horaundcr is
pri~ry fnd unconditional and shall not bo aubjoct 10 ony olfsot, doforuso, or counterclaim of tho Obligor, Thia GuarontH and

.,.
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Wiiivor i11 ,. continuing ono ond o11 liabilitlee to which it applloe or moy apply undor tho tollll& horoof chell be conclusivoly
prosumod to how boon crootod in rolionco horoof. TilO boob ond rocOf'd• of Sentry oholl bo odminiblo as prime focia ovidonco
of tho Liobilitios of tho Obligor. A• to tho Guorantor, 1fn Guorontoo and w,-ver •twill contiouo until wrinon notioo of rovoeotion
11igpod by tho Guarantor shml hovo boon ectulllly rocoivod by Sontry, nowrithstonding a r<tVOOalioo by, or oomploto or partial
rol~at10 for eny oouoo of, oithor tho Guwantor or tho Obligor, or of any ono liablo in MY monnor for tho Uobilitioe of tho Obligor
horoby guorontood, or for tho liabi!ilin lincludino thoso heroin) incurred diroctty or indirectly in rospoct thoroof or horoof, 11 nd
no~withstanding tho dissolution, termination, or incroaso, decroaao, or change In poraonnol of any ono or moro of tho undoraignod
which moy bo partnol'llhipo or oorponsliOM.
I

tdl No rovocotion or torminotion horoof ahell affect in any monnor ony right& l:lrising undor thia Guarrmtoo ond Wcivor with
roaP.act to (1) liobilitioe which 11hall have boon croatod, contlocted, u!IUfflod, or lncunod prior to recoipt by Sentry of wrinon
notice of ouch rovocotion or termination,. « (21 liobililios which ahaU have boon crutod, oontractod, usumod, or lncurtod oftor
rocJ.pt of 11uch written notice purauom to any ee>nUIICt antorod Into by Sontry prior to roooipt of such notice; end tho solo offoct
of rovocotion or torminotion horoof •hdl bt to oxdudo from thio Guorantoo and Wflivor liebllitioe tt-oaftor milling wNch ore
unconnoctod with liobilitios thorotoforo orisino or troni11,cdon,, thorotoforo entered Into.

!

·.

.

iol If, within ton (10) dovs oftor tho doto of tho happoning of 11ny default of Obligor undor tho Loon Dooumonto, Guuontor
has not fully curod tho auch dafoult. than et any timo tharollftor, Sentry moy, without notice to tho Obliger, but with written
notice to tho Guorontor, mo.ko tho liabilitio• of tho Obligor to Sentry, whothor or not thon duo, imrnodiatoly duo and poyablo
horobndor os to tho Guarantor, ond Sentry 11hall bo ontidod 10 enforce tho obliQlltions of tho Guarantor horoundor. In addition,
upo~ tho happening of any of tho following ovonts: tho insolvency or s1.11;ponsion of businoes of tho Guarantor qr tho issuonco
of any worront or ottochmont against any of tho proporty of tho Guarantor (and any such worrunt or attachmont is not di&ehargod
within twenty (20) days), or tho making by tho undorsignod of ony 011signmont for tho bonefit of croditors, or a trusto:o or receiver
being appointod for tho Guaronlor or for any of it& proporty tend 11uch appointment ia not tonninatod in favor of tho Guorantor
within twenty (201 days), or any procooding being commenced by or agflinst tho Guarantor under any bankruptcy, roorganizetion,
orrongemont of dobt. insolvency, roodjulltl'nOnt of debt. rocoivor11hlp, liquidotion or dissolution law or· stetuto (end such
proc~oding is not dismlesod within twenty (201 doyol - than end in any such ovent. ond st any time thoroaftor. Sontry may,
withdut nodco to tho Obliger, but with writton nolico to tho Guarantor, molc;o tho Liabilities of tho Obligor to Sontry whothor or
not thon duo, immodiatoly duo and poyoblo horoundor as to tho Guorantor, and Sontry shall be 11ntillod to onlorco tho obligations
of tho, Guarantor horoundor. Any and bll dllims of any naturo which tho Guarontor may now or horooftor havo agwnst tho Obliger
oro horoby subordinated to the fuU paymont to Sontry of tho Uobilitios of tho Obliger ond aro horoby assigned 10 Sontry as
PClditibnal collator at security therefor.
(fl In tho ovonl Sentry rotains an onomoy (whothor io-houso or othorwisol for tho purposo of oHocting colloction of tho
Liabilities of the Obliger or of tho Guoiontor hereunder, tho Guarantor i;;hllll pay 1111 costs 11nd oxponsos of ovory kind for
colloc6on, including roaaom,blo 11ttomoys' foos.

(gl, If claim is ovor made upon Sentry for repavn,ont or rocovory of any omount or amounts rocoived bv Sentry in pe','fflont
or on account of ony of tho Liabilities of tho Obligor and Sentry ropoys ell or pert of said emount by rooson of (1) an·, judgment,
docroo~ or ordor of any court or odmlnistrotivo body hoving jurisdiction ovnr Sentry or any of its proporty, or (2) any i;;ottlemant
or compromise of any euch deim offoctod by Sontry with any such claimant (including tho Obligor), then snd in such event the
Guarentor ogroos thot any euch judgment. docr1>0, ordl>f, 11ottlomanl, or compromise shall bo binding upon t~ Guarantor,
notwithstanding ony rovocotion hereof or th<11'concollotion of ony note or othor instrument ovidoncing any liability of tho Obliger,
ond th~ Guarantor shall be end remain fieblo to Sentry horoundor for tho amount 110 repaid or recov11rod to tho GIima oxtont es
ii such amount had nova, originolly boon rocoivod by Sentry.

I

lhl No dol11y on tho part of Sentry in exorcising any of its options, powors 01 rights, or partial or singlo oxorciso thoroof, shall
constituto a woivor thereof. No woivor of any of its right& horoundor. end no modification or amondmont of this Guarontoo and
Weivor.;shall bo doomed to be modo by Sontry unless tho samo shall bo in writing, duly signed on behalf of Sentry, and each
such wf.vor, if 11ny, shell opply only with rospoct to tho upocific instenco involved, and aholl in no way impair tho rights of Sontry
or the obligations of tho Guorontor to Sontry in any other respect ol ony other time. Tho Guarantor shall hovo no right of
subrogation against tho Obliger or any aocurity hold for eny Liobilitios ol tho Obligor until Sontry shell have boon paid in lull all
Uabililio~ of tho Obligor, in which caso Sontry will nsign ond subrogato llll of its right, titlo ond intorost in end to tho Loan
Oocumo~ts.
lil T~s Guorentoo and Weivor and tho rights and obligations of Sentry and of tho Gu11r11ntoc horoundor ehall bo govornod
and construod in accordenco with tho lawa of tho State ol Utah: 11nd this Guarontoo and Wai.vor is binding upon tho Guorontor,
il.11 succo~sors ond assigns, 11nd •hall inuro to tho benefit ol Sentry, its auccoasora ond assigns. Tho undorsignod horoby conoanla
to tho oi<cluaivo jurisdiction of tho Third Judiciol Di•trict Coun for Solt I..Dko County, Stato of µteh (tho •eour1•1, for 11
dolormination of any diaputo as to ony f!Mltton horoundor and outhorixo11 aorvico of prooo11t by tho Court for o dotorminGtion of
CM'ly disp(lto 1111 to any •uch mattol'll by lffrvioo of procos, on tho Guarantor by conlliod or rogisterod moil aont 10 tho Gu.arantor
ot tho addreu of tho Guorontor HI forth below. The Guorontoo ond WOAvor moy bo assigned, tranuforrod end not over by Sontry

·•·
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to ony other pol'llon, finn or corporation without tho consont of tho Guarantor and, upon notico in writing mado by Sontry's
••llipnoo or uensforoo of st1ch iissignmont of thi11 Guarantoo and Waiver, all of tho right111 Dtld' romodioe of Sentry and tho liabilities
of dWl Guarantor horoundor aholl inuro to tho ullO CIOd benefit of such aallignoo or troneforoo ond the liabilitios of tho Guarantor
hor~ndor •hall cpply with tho ecmo tOfco Dtld' ottoct os if thi11 Guarantoo and Wmvor hod originolly boon oxo~od and dolivorod
by tho Gunrantor dirocdy to euch usignoo Dtld' transloroo.

IJ1 Thia Guarontoo end Wri,,vor and tho righta and oblioatioos of Sentry Dnd tho Guorentor haroundor 11hall remain in tull forco
and oftoct until tho Obligor hall 11oti,fiod In tull oil of tho obligation, and UcbilitiH of tho Obligor undor tho Loan Docvmonts.
ci11tod as

'

ot April

29, 1994

I

STATE OF UTAH

: as.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:

)

(~

On this }J: day ot May, 1994, porsonally appoorod boforo mo, BOYD J. BROWN who, boiog by r1'H:I duly sworn. did say th111
ho is tho signor of tho cibovo G rontoo nnd Wriivor who, upon boing by mo duly sworn, duly ocknowlodgod to mo that he
oxo<::\.ltod the o,imo and hat
111otomonts contni
heroin ond thoroin oro tn.Jo.

NOTARY PUBLIC

MARCO 8. KUNZ

201 So. Main #1400

S.LC., UT
8411 t
COMMISSION EXPIRES
JAN. 10, l998

STATE

or

UTAH

...
..
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ADDENDUMI
MUTUAL RELEASE

(R.317)

•
•

•
•

•
•

•
•

Thii> t..11111.:il Rnlr.aso !s nntmm1 into this

'In-

day cf

/) ,-:,: r' ,YI Q~C

,

19 'if•, bv

and IJotwour. Sentry Financial Corporation l"Se:ntry"l, a Urah Corporntion, and David K. Gill9U,
l''Giilott"), an indlvidual.
RECITALS

WHEREAS, Se11Cf',' and Gillett agreed to compromistl and settle any and all disputes among
them arising from c1nd in connection vvirh (al th,~ loan made by Sonuy to Gillott. tho torms of which
are set forth in a IE:tter agretiment dated as of April 29, 1 ::194, {b) the subsequent foreclosure action
by Sentry and SFC AircraH Corp. I {"SFC Aircraft") (cl the: ;>Uction of M:::jastic Airlines, Inc.
IJfoparcy on or aoo~u October 6, I 005 by Srarman Bros. Auctions. Inc., ldl the sale or othor
disposition of property on which Samry or SF'C Aircraf1 holds a lien and lei any other rransaclion
relared to or caf!nected with the above-referenced t1,ll\sactions.

NOW, THEREFORE, for the considerarion ht:reinaf:er set forth and thtl mutual promises and
covenants containad herein and ache.- good ant.I vaiuable ~onslderarion. tlle sufliciancy of which is
horuby :icknowlodgod, IT :s HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
I.
Si;ntq, and GilhJtt mutuc11!y r1.tlt1as0r:, forever discharg1: end agree to hold harmless o..ich othor,
.ind anv an<f all of ,hair .illied or related companies. emplo•;ues. partners. agents. officors, directors.
sh;.;rehold1m;, n.presem~ti .es and all othar alih.id o, related persons, ::ind Bo\•d Brown, an individual,
fro,·n ;uw and all cl.)ims . ..:cmt1r1<1:s. c;:unagos. actions. counts. causes of action, or suits at law of
whatev~r kind Jnd ,wwru, ond from all costs and attorneys' fees accruing and to accrue to each
llth~r on accou11t of ,mv ;;i~id 011 known and unknown lossns or damages directly or Indirectly related
to tho facts or transactions set forth b%, 1:w•Ji,pq'f;IClt. above.

A condition preced,mt to 1fie release of (iillett by Sa11try is that Gillett tum over to Sentry ot to
S~ntry shall autl\orite 10 accept propony an b1thillf of Sflntry RII propP.rty
thac ;~ ovmed or !leld ()$ CCJll.itoral by s,wtry anl.l or SFC Aircraft, inr:lmiirio wilhnur limir;irlon al!
.ii,craft. aircrnft loo::iooks and c..thi!r recl·,rds. aircraft pans and e~uipmi:,nt, ci;:iims and cause& of
<lcuw J;Jainst insuranc& companies. lrE:ighr carrio1s and other 1>arrie, relatinu 10 aircraft anti airr.r:ifr
p.;rts und oc;uipmeflt hhe "Prooerty") that is hoid b•1 Gille1 r. Majesr,c Airline:\, lnr.., nrhAr rnlRtP<i
ontitios owned or comrolled by Gillett, and other amities nrlt related to Gillon but 10 which Gillert o,
2.

sucll oerson or person$ v$

Jn on1i1y conuolled by Gillete hth'o 1;1ivan µo;)::H1~:.ion of lht! frop~ri,.

3.
Th;s: Aoreom,mt ~ha!! i.>e bindin1, on 3nd sholl il\ura to tho bunolit of the ponies hcroto end
th(l,, rospective succ:essor;S an(I ,1:.:iiiJll:!..
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